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NO. 13 MARCH 2019 Introduction 
Is Tunisia Really Democratising? 
Progress, Resistance, and an Uncertain Outlook 
Max Gallien and Isabelle Werenfels 
January 2019 marked the eighth anniversary of the end of the Ben Ali dictatorship – 
the celebrations however were marred by massive social protests. Opinions both in 
Tunisia and abroad differ about the state of Tunisia’s political development as it 
gears up for its second parliamentary and presidential elections since the adoption of 
the new constitution in 2014. While some consider its democratisation to be virtually 
complete, others fear a relapse into autocracy. Despite its considerable democratic 
achievements, Tunisia is in danger of developing into a hybrid system: part democratic, 
part authoritarian. This is not only due to the difficult economic and regional con-
text. Critically, the political, economic and administrative networks of the old system, 
as well as persistent authoritarian practices and “old” rhetoric in politics and society, 
complicate the deepening of its fragile democracy. Tunisia’s international partners 
should make it their explicit objective to weaken these counter-currents. 
 
Eight years after the end of the dictatorship, 
Tunisia is the only country that has democ-
ratised following the so-called Arab Spring. 
The Tunisian transition is even more re-
markable as the regional security context 
and the profound economic crisis since 
2011 have been anything but conducive to 
democratisation. 
However, on the anniversary of the 
revolution in January 2019, the headlines 
in Tunisian and international media were 
dominated not by democratic achieve-
ments, but by massive social protests, a 
general strike and power struggles within 
the political elite. After almost four years, 
conflicts between its two largest parties, 
the secular Nidaa Tounes and the moderate 
Islamist Ennahdha, have thrown the gov-
erning coalition into a serious crisis. The 
main point of contention was the growing 
conflict in 2018 between President Béji Caid 
Essebsi and Prime Minister Youssef Chahed 
(then a member of Nidaa Tounes). Essebsi 
pushed for Chahed, whom he had originally 
nominated, to be replaced. For the sake of 
continuity and stability, however, Ennahdha 
insisted that the prime minister remain in 
office. In late January 2019, Chahed then 
founded his own political party, Tahya 
Tounes, to occupy the social and political 
centre. It seems likely that Chahed will run 
for the presidential elections in November 
2019. The 92-year-old incumbent, Essebsi, 
may run again as well. Another candidate 
from the currently strongest party, Ennah-
dha, remains a possibility. If, as expected, 
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Ennahdha again performs strongly in the 
October 2019 parliamentary elections, 
the party may get to play the role of king 
maker. 
This politicking takes place against the 
background of an extremely tense economic 
situation. Tunisia relies on international 
credit to avert national bankruptcy. Donors, 
above all the International Monetary Fund, 
are demanding austerity measures and 
structural reforms. At the same time, the 
unions’ powerful umbrella organisation, 
the Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail 
(UGTT), has mobilised massively against 
austerity measures. Chahed and the UGTT 
reached an agreement on wage increases in 
early February, but the stalemate between 
the government and the UGTT, which 
lasted for months and was accompanied 
by strikes, has aggravated the economic 
situation and further boosted the wide-
spread socio-economic and political pro-
tests. It is likely that the struggle between 
the government and UGTT for economic 
reform and austerity measures will con-
tinue into the electoral campaigns. 
To interpret these dynamics mainly as 
a result of novel democratic freedoms and 
political competition, however, would be 
short-sighted. They are also an expression 
of the difficulty of consolidating democrati-
sation in Tunisia. Anti-democratic elite net-
works in politics, business and administra-
tion, entrenched authoritarian practices 
and an “old” rhetoric are still part of the 
country’s political repertoire. Together, 
these have been driving factors in ensuring 
that it has not yet been possible to anchor 
the considerable post-2011 political achieve-
ments in such a way as to make them irre-
versible. 
The Achievements 
In principle, conditions for the consolida-
tion of Tunisian democracy would appear 
excellent. Tunisia’s constitution, adopted 
in 2014, is rightly regarded as a milestone 
in North Africa’s political history, and the 
region’s most progressive and democratic 
constitution. It explicitly limits the role of 
the military; guarantees equality between 
men and women; emphasises the independ-
ence of the judiciary; and creates the basis 
for decentralising political responsibility. 
Tunisia’s constitution establishes a system 
in which executive power is shared be-
tween the prime minister elected by parlia-
ment and the directly elected president. 
This is meant to prevent a regular occur-
rence in the region: the concentration of 
political power in a single person. Last but 
not least, the constitution lays the foun-
dation for the separation of politics and 
religion. 
Alongside its content, the very drafting 
of the constitution was an important 
achievement in Tunisia’s post-revolutionary 
development, earning some of its protago-
nists the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize. In 2013, 
civil society actors negotiated a compromise 
which was supported by almost the entire 
political spectrum, breaking a deadlock 
concerning the constitutional process fol-
lowing the assassination of two leftist 
politicians. 
Since the adoption of its constitution, 
Tunisia has held parliamentary and presi-
dential elections in 2014 and local elections 
in 2018. The organisation of the elections 
was conducted by the Independent Electoral 
Commission (Instance Supérieure Indépendante 
pour les Elections, ISIE) to international 
acclaim, as both the parties involved and 
international election observers recognised 
the elections as free and fair. Throughout 
these processes, Islamist as well as secular 
parties showed that they can adhere to the 
democratic rules of the game. 
These positive developments have 
demonstrated the relevance of an active 
and rapidly developing civil society. Newly 
won civil rights allowed so-called “watch-
dog” organisations, such as AlBawsala, 
I-Watch or Nawaat, to help shape Tunisia’s 
development as critical observers and 
opinion leaders – not least through cam-
paigns on social media. It is particularly 
noteworthy that Tunisian civil society has 
the only officially recognised (albeit in 
March 2019 again contested) organisation 
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in North Africa, Shams, which is committed 
to the rights of the LGBTI community and 
calls for LGBTI people to be decriminalised. 
Civil society was also instrumental in 
passing a 2017 law that protects whistle-
blowers who uncover corruption, and the 
establishment and support of the so-called 
Truth and Dignity Commission (Instance de 
Vérité et Dignité, IVD) to investigate human 
rights abuses in the country’s authoritarian 
past. Its mandate expired in December 2018. 
However, it is precisely with respect to 
the extremely sensitive issue of Tunisia’s 
authoritarian legacy that the limits and 
deficiencies of the new Tunisian political 
structure have become apparent. A tug-of-
war has developed between reform- and 
status-quo-orientated political actors 
around the IVD, its competences, its work-
ing methods and the potential extension of 
its mandate – with the latter too frequently 
retaining the upper hand. 
The Limits of Democratisation 
Difficulties in consolidating Tunisia’s 
democratisation are most visible in the 
judiciary, the security sector and the fight 
against corruption. 
The judiciary. Almost five years after the 
adoption of the new constitution, Tunisia 
still has no constitutional court – so far, 
only one of the twelve stipulated judges 
has been confirmed by parliament. This has 
serious consequences: the constitutionality 
of several laws passed in recent years has 
been controversial, as were the respective 
powers of the president and prime minister. 
Repeatedly, the country has found itself on 
the verge of a constitutional crisis. Beyond 
the Constitutional Court, further reforms 
of the judiciary are needed to ensure its in-
dependence and transparency – the broad 
jurisdiction and application of military 
authority, for example, remains highly 
problematic. 
The security sector. Even more worrying is 
the situation in the security sector, particu-
larly within the Ministry of the Interior. 
The overall capacities of Tunisia’s security 
forces have improved in recent years, mainly 
as a result of extensive support from inter-
national partners. Nevertheless, fundamen-
tal internal reforms, especially of the police, 
have been delayed. The sector continues to 
a large extent to operate in a non-transpar-
ent, fragmented manner and with insuffi-
cient accountability or parliamentary super-
vision. The role of new, increasingly politi-
cally active, trade unions within the security 
sector, especially the police, is particularly 
worrying, as they have repeatedly and bla-
tantly blackmailed the legislative and judi-
cial branches (see p. 4). The frequent declar-
ation of a state of emergency and the pro-
liferation of anti-terror laws in cases where 
there is no obvious link to terrorism pre-
vent greater transparency in the security 
apparatus and can undermine civil and 
human rights, including freedom of expres-
sion. In 2018, the blogger and parliamen-
tarian Yassine Ayari was sentenced to 
prison for a Facebook entry, under the pre-
text of undermining army cohesion. 
The economy. Thus far, the reform of the 
corrupt economic structures of the old 
system has also fallen short. Investigations 
were largely limited to the family of former 
President Ben Ali and to a few politically 
opportune and high-profile cases. Inde-
pendent state institutions that combat 
corruption, such as the Instance Nationale de 
la Lutte contre la Corruption, remain without 
sufficient political support. The manage-
ment of the extensive economic assets con-
fiscated from the former dictator and his 
family has also proven difficult. Legal am-
biguities, overlapping competences and a 
lack of resources and political will have led 
to corruption and mismanagement of these 
assets, alongside the rehabilitation of promi-
nent figures from the so-called Ben Ali clan. 
A law passed in 2017 was particularly 
controversial in this context, as it issued a 
general amnesty to senior officials accused 
of corruption under the Ben Ali regime. An 
earlier draft of this law, which would have 
extended the amnesty to the entire private 
sector, had failed as a result of massive pro-
tests from civil society. Nevertheless, it 
must be noted that initiatives to unbundle 
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the political from the economic sphere in 
Tunisia have not yet been successful. Thus, 
a central mechanism through which the 
Ben Ali regime was able to accumulate 
power and profit has still not been elimi-
nated.  
Counter-Currents to 
Democratisation 
The facts set out above – that the judiciary 
cannot (yet) fully exercise its independent 
role, that no fundamental reforms have 
taken place in the security sector, and that 
corrupt economic elites of the old system 
remain largely unchallenged – are due to 
a number of counter-currents to democrati-
sation that frequently infiltrate or block 
necessary reforms. 
Networks 
Old networks within the security sector, the 
economic elites and the administration are 
considerable disruptors for Tunisia’s democ-
ratisation. They have acquired a quasi-veto 
power over various reform processes. An 
example of this are the police unions: in 
2012, they temporarily prevented the dis-
missal of a Director General in the Ministry 
of the Interior, who was later convicted for 
the killing of demonstrators by the security 
forces in 2011. Since 2015, security sector 
unions have also been trying to force the 
legislature to adopt a particular law by pro-
testing and threatening to stop providing 
security. Among other things, this law 
would ensure impunity for actors in the 
security sector even when they use lethal 
force to protect property. 
These various networks are not aiming 
to restore the status quo ante. Rather, their 
primary motivation lies in safeguarding 
their own spoils and interests. These are 
more difficult to achieve in a consolidated 
democratic system with appropriate levels 
of transparency and accountability. 
Old Networks in the Economy 
Many Tunisians had hoped that democrati-
sation would bring not only new political 
institutions, but also a more inclusive, 
fairer and less corrupt economic order. 
So far, these hopes have largely been dis-
appointed. The family clan of former 
President Ben Ali, who had established a 
patronage economy through corruption 
and intimidation, has largely left the coun-
try. However, other politically and inter-
nationally well-connected economic elites 
remain active. Their political interest lies 
above all in defending privileges they have 
gained under the old regime. Moreover, 
they aim to avert reforms that could in-
crease transparency and competition and 
thus lead to the emergence of new eco-
nomic competitors. For decades, their influ-
ence has contributed to low tax revenues, 
a growing informal sector, and a non-trans-
parent system of regulation that has placed 
a massive burden on the Tunisian economy. 
This form of strategic opacity is also one 
reason why parts of the economic elite, and 
in particular the service elite, are opposed 
to the comprehensive free trade agreement 
with the EU that the government is currently 
negotiating. Furthermore, these networks 
are also trying to prevent processes under 
which economic elites could be held account-
able over their links to Ben Ali’s regime – 
here too they have been extremely successful. 
This is not least due to the considerable 
influence that these business networks are 
able to exert on public opinion. Although 
freedom of the press is anchored in the new 
constitution, the high concentration of 
media ownership in the hands of a few, 
sometimes politically ambitious, actors has 
prevented a diverse, professional and in-
dependent press landscape from develop-
ing. Consequently, the press and the clas-
sical audio-visual media (radio, TV) do not 
reflect the great diversity of the actual 
political landscape. In addition, there have 
been concerted and politically motivated 
media campaigns, for example against the 
IVD or against Ennahdha, which has few sup-
porters in the described economic net-
works. 
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Last but not least, these networks have 
also benefited from the return of important 
cadres from Ben Ali’s quasi-unified party 
Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique 
(RCD), which was dissolved in 2011, to high 
positions in politics and administration. In 
fact, more than a fifth of the 43 ministers 
and under-secretaries of state of the Chahed 
government of 2017–18 had already served 
as ministers and/or RCD cadres during the 
Ben Ali period. 
It is important to highlight that the 
various networks with connections to the 
old system do not form a common front. 
Rather, they are very diverse cliques whose 
interests overlap when it comes to fending 
off regulations and legislation for more 
transparency, accountability and investiga-
tions into their role under authoritarian-
ism. 
Practices 
Among the counter-currents that impede 
the consolidation of Tunisia’s democratisa-
tion are long-standing authoritarian reflexes 
and practices displayed by a wide range of 
actors beginning with the head of state and 
reaching far beyond the political sphere 
into society. 
President Essebsi has repeatedly exceeded 
the powers and jurisdiction of his office. 
For instance, when Prime Minister Chahed 
organised a partial cabinet reshuffle at the 
end of 2018, Essebsi initially refused his 
approval on the grounds that he had not 
been consulted. The new constitution, how-
ever, does not provide for such consultation 
with regard to non-strategic ministries, as 
was the case here. Within this pattern fits 
Essebsi’s repeated advocacy for moving 
to a straightforward presidential system. 
Moreover, Essebsi frequently demon-
strates little respect for democratic pro-
cedures within parties. A co-founder of 
Nidaa who left the party to become presi-
dent, Essebsi has been trying for several 
years to make his son chairman of Nidaa 
Tounes, against considerable resistance with-
in the party. After Nidaa’s merger with the 
smaller UPL in 2018, the latter’s head 
became secretary-general of Nidaa instead. 
In February 2019, however, he was sentenced 
in absentia to five years in prison for cor-
ruption. 
Within many other parties, internal pro-
cedures are often only borderline democratic 
and disproportionately benefit well-en-
trenched individuals within the party. Fre-
quently, personalities trump content. 
The emphasis on charismatic leaders, 
known in the Maghreb as “zaïmisme”, 
means that important decisions are often 
not negotiated in government and parlia-
ment, but agreed upon informally. This 
happened repeatedly between President 
Essebsi and the Ennahdha’s president Rachid 
Ghannouchi, who in Tunisian jargon are 
revealingly known as “sheikhs”. 
Another practice that is particularly 
problematic for Tunisia’s democratisation 
is the parties’ widespread lack of financial 
transparency. According to a January 2019 
statement by I-Watch, 96 percent of the over 
200 Tunisian parties have so far refused to 
submit financial reports or statements. A 
draft law on reforming party financing has 
been awaiting adoption since late 2017. 
The fact that this law has not yet been 
passed is in part due to the quest for ‘con-
sensus at all costs’ – often perceived as the 
unofficial political doctrine of the Essebsi-
Ghannouchi’s partnership from 2014 to 
2018. Thus, in the interest of maintaining 
consensus, Ennahdha has always been in-
centivised to tilt towards Nidaa’s prefer-
ences. This explains why Ennahdha agreed 
to the law on amnesty for administrative 
cadres and the anti-terrorism law, even 
though both were highly controversial 
among the party’s base. Paradoxically, the 
consensus principle has thereby also hin-
dered the deepening of democracy. Ennah-
dha here acts on fears of renewed exclusion 
– during the Ben Ali period, the party was 
banned, and its members were persecuted. 
This concern increased with the military 
coup against the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt in 2013, and is likely to ensure that 
Ennahdha continues to seek consensus. 
Authoritarian reflexes are also at work 
outside politics, as the power structures of 
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the old regime were not limited to the for-
mal political sphere. Highly hierarchical 
structures continue to exist within the ad-
ministrative apparatus, but also in schools 
and universities. Here, too, overreach and 
the creation of informal power structures 
by well-networked individuals are also com-
mon in the absence of functioning institu-
tional supervisory bodies. 
All these practices reduce transparency, 
strengthen clientelist and personalised net-
works, and make it more difficult to anchor 
the new democratic ‘rules of the game’ in 
society. 
Rhetoric 
Another important factor that counteracts 
‘deep’ democratisation in Tunisia is the 
rhetoric frequently used by Tunisian politi-
cians at home and abroad to fend off key 
structural reforms. 
When communicating with the popula-
tion, many Tunisian decision-makers tend 
to systematically and disproportionately 
shift political responsibility and power on-
to foreign actors. The United Arab Emirates, 
France, the European Union, so-called “Is-
lamic State” or the USA are thus commonly 
presented as the actors that are actually 
‘pulling the strings’ in domestic political 
disputes. Often occult networks are also 
evoked, made up of local actors that are 
‘lacking patriotism’. This not only fuels the 
widespread tendency towards conspiracy 
theories in both the media and the general 
population, but also allows political elites 
to discredit foreign media that report 
critically, as well as independent Tunisian 
media professionals and non-governmental 
organisations that ‘sully Tunisia’s image’. 
This kind of rhetoric obscures the role of 
democratically elected institutions in the 
practice of politics and suggests that these 
institutions are of little political relevance. 
Furthermore, it has been striking how 
frequently leading Tunisian politicians and 
Tunisian media since 2018 have referred 
to regular political processes that go against 
their interests ‘coup attempts’. Accompa-
nied by repeated talk of thwarted coups by 
external actors, this systematically gener-
ates a discourse that blurs the boundaries 
between democratic and undemocratic 
action. Worse yet, it creates an atmosphere 
that justifies radical political measures. This 
kind of rhetoric is particularly worth noting 
as it is closely connected to Tunisia’s politi-
cal history: the coup that brought Ben Ali 
to power in 1987 was also often justified as 
preventing a competing coup attempt by 
Islamists. 
Old rhetorical patterns can also be found 
in the image that Tunisia seeks to convey 
to an international audience in recent years. 
In Ben Ali’s day, Tunisian officials tried to 
sell the ‘Singapore model’, i.e. to present 
Tunisia as an authoritarian, but well-func-
tioning, well-governed and economically 
successful country. In the immediate years 
after 2011, the discourse was dominated 
by the ‘model democracy’ that had slipped 
into an economic crisis due to the mistakes 
of the Ben Ali regime and the turbulence 
of the revolution. For some years now, how-
ever, the discourse has changed again. 
Actors who once held high positions in the 
Ben Ali era and have returned to hold offi-
cial posts are not the only ones to present 
2011 as a contretemps of history, claiming 
that the upheaval caused the country’s 
economic, security and governance prob-
lems. In romantic depictions of the Ben Ali 
years, democratic successes since 2011 are 
rarely mentioned; instead, the country is 
presented as needing to get back on the 
track from which it deviated in 2011. It is 
worth noting that some of these discourses 
are also adopted by foreign partners whose 
focus has shifted from democratising to 
stabilising Tunisia.  
What unites old rhetorical patterns at 
home and abroad is that they treat Tuni-
sia’s political development and its economy 
and security situation as separate issues. 
Economic and security challenges are attri-
buted to external actors and presented as a 
burden on the political reform process. This 
is then used to justify the delay and post-
ponement of reforms, often with reference 
to failed democratisation processes in 
Algeria or Libya. This rhetorical separation 
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deliberately conceals the links and net-
worked relationships between business, 
security and politics – the very space in 
which the power base of anti-democratic 
networks is located. 
The cumulative effect of this rhetoric, 
authoritarian practices and obvious machi-
nations by anti-democratic networks is an 
increase of the social, economic and politi-
cal costs of transition. One of its results 
is the population’s declining confidence 
in the capacity of democratic processes to 
create order and social justice. For example, 
only 33.7 percent of registered voters took 
part in the first free local elections in Tuni-
sia’s history in the spring of 2018. A survey 
conducted by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in 
2016 showed significantly lower confidence 
in parliament than in the army or police – 
this is unlikely to have changed much since 
then. Parliament is not only under-equipped 
and over-burdened with the large number 
of new laws generated by the transition, 
but power struggles within the governing 
coalition also have a negative impact on 
the speed and quality of parliamentary 
processes and debates. 
Simply Déjà-Vu? 
Tunisia’s history shows that democratisa-
tion is by no means sure to deepen and 
succeed automatically. In the late 1980s, 
shortly after Ben Ali took power, there was 
already a brief period of optimism among 
international observers. They particularly 
praised elections involving several parties, 
formal commitments to human rights and 
social justice, and the use of the consensus 
principle. “The honesty and devotion of 
Bourguiba’s successor have brightened the 
mood in Tunisia,” wrote American political 
scientist Mark Tessler in 1990, stating that 
the country had “made significant progress 
in its quest for democracy”. 
Progress was soon followed by regression 
and the Ben Ali dictatorship. Nevertheless, 
history is unlikely to repeat itself here. The 
current struggle between democratically-
minded and status-quo actors cannot be 
compared with the early Ben Ali period. 
The formal political framework is different 
– Tunisia’s strong civil society, which has 
been operating in great freedom for more 
than eight years now, has no historical 
equivalent. In early 2019, the AlBawsala 
organisation was able to sue the president 
for abuse of power and a breach of the con-
stitution – without fear of the consequences. 
The outcome of these legal proceedings is 
still open. 
As a result, in early 2019 there is little 
reason to believe that the old system will 
be re-established. But neither is the consoli-
dation of democracy realistic unless the 
described counter-currents abate – which 
does not appear to be happening. For the 
foreseeable future, this raises the prospect 
of a hybrid system in which democratic 
elements and processes are muddled with 
authoritarian reflexes and sometimes anti-
democratic measures. 
Recommendations for 
External Actors 
Against this backdrop, Tunisia’s German 
and European partners and the international 
donor community have an interest in curb-
ing the counter-currents described above. 
To prevent Tunisia from getting mired in 
a hybrid system, the following measures are 
therefore desirable: 
∎ Continue to set political priorities, even 
if the discourse increasingly focuses on 
the economic and security situation. This 
should include the independence of the 
judiciary and administrative reforms. 
∎ Help defend the freedom to operate for 
watchdog organisations, journalists and 
civil-society associations. 
∎ Promote diversity within civil society and 
above all in the press, and counter pub-
lic-opinion monopolies by supporting plat-
forms for critical and minority voices. 
∎ In both political and economic coopera-
tion, insist on official channels, rule-
based work, and transparency. 
∎ Critically examine the role of individual 
actors, organisations or state bodies (in-
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cluding partners of German foundations) 
in Tunisia’s political development and 
openly address problematic networks, 
practices and rhetoric. 
∎ Appeal to political leaders’ sense of 
responsibility and ask for reliable evi-
dence when they make serious accusa-
tions, for example of attempted coups. 
Conversely, it would be advisable for Tuni-
sia’s international partners to avoid the fol-
lowing in the interests of greater democra-
tisation: 
∎ Rely on non-transparent networks, in-
cluding for economic or political cooper-
ation, even if they promise short-term 
advantages. 
∎ Describe and treat Tunisia’s democrati-
sation as successfully completed. 
∎ Adopt the prevailing rhetoric uncritically. 
∎ Make unrealistic comparisons for drama 
or embellishment – comparisons to 
Libya and Syria, or to European model 
democracies are not an appropriate yard-
stick. 
Democratic transitions take time. It was un-
realistic to expect that Tunisia could be a 
consolidated democracy eight years after 
the revolution. In this respect, the outcome 
of this assessment – that the country is 
tending towards a hybrid system – is not 
necessarily a bad one. The crucial point 
here is that such a hybrid system would 
probably not be able to carry out the key 
reforms which both the international com-
munity and the Tunisian population ex-
pect. Reforming the state apparatus and 
highly corrupt economic structures is im-
perative to ensure sustainable social and 
political stability in Tunisia. Preventing 
hybrid political structures from becoming 
entrenched is therefore of critical im-
portance. 
Max Gallien is a Visiting Fellow and Dr Isabelle Werenfels is a Senior Fellow  
in the Middle East and Africa Division at SWP. 
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